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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Alfred Davidson and Lamorthe Delva (“Appellants”) appeal the judgments of 
conviction entered by the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands, Division of 
St. Thomas and St. John.
1
 For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.   
I.  
 On November 2, 2012, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) Officer Glenn 
Rogers received an anonymous tip that illegal aliens were in the Estate Zootenval area on 
the island of St. John in the United States Virgin Islands. Officer Rogers and two other 
CBP officers went to investigate. At about the same time, National Park Service Ranger 
David Horner received information that illegal aliens were in the Haulover beach area of 
St. John. Ranger Horner went to the area and found life jackets and clothes in bushes. 
While leaving the area, Ranger Horner passed a silver pickup truck parked on the side of 
the road. He saw two people come out of the bushes who seemed to duck as they saw 
him. Ranger Horner sent this information to the CBP officers and told them that the truck 
was headed in the officers’ direction. The CBP officers formed a road block to stop the 
truck. The truck ultimately came to a stop. Two of the officers saw Delva exit the front 
passenger seat of the truck and run through some bushes. Davidson, the driver of the 
                                              
1
 Davidson and Delva have filed separate appeals (No. 13-2657 and No. 13-3068) but we 
will address them together as they involve the same set of facts and the same jury trial.  
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truck, was arrested and taken to the CBP office where he gave a statement regarding the 
day’s incident. The five other passengers in the truck were later identified as Haitian 
immigrants who had come to St. John illegally. Delva was arrested several days later 
after being identified by Davidson.  
 On December 6, 2012, a federal grand jury issued an indictment charging Delva 
and Davidson with one count of aiding and abetting the transportation of illegal aliens 
(Count One), in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and Davidson with one count of 
assault with a deadly weapon on a federal officer (Count Two), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 111(a)(1) and (b). The case went to trial before a federal jury that found both 
Davidson and Delva guilty of Count One and Davidson guilty of Count Two. Davidson 




 Appellants argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support their 
convictions and that the District Court should have granted their Rule 29 motions for a 
judgment of acquittal. Davidson further argues that his Rule 33 motion for a new trial 
should have been granted because the District Court erred in: (1) admitting, through the 
testimony of a CBP officer, a statement Davidson made upon his arrest; (2) declining to 
instruct the jury on the defense of justification; and (3) failing to voir dire prospective 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although Davidson and Delva have 
completed the terms of imprisonment to which they were sentenced, their appeals are not 
moot because their terms of supervised release have not expired. See United States v. 
Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that a defendant may appeal his 
conviction even after his term of imprisonment has ended if he is still serving a term of 
supervised release).  
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jurors on whether they would give more weight to the testimony of a law enforcement 
officer than to the testimony of a private citizen. We will affirm Appellants’ judgments of 
conviction.  
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for 
acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, applying the same standard as the 
district court.” United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 2008). “We review 
the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States 
v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Our review is “highly deferential.” Id.  
1. Transporting Illegal Aliens 
 To sustain a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), the government must 
prove that: “(1) the defendant transported or attempted to transport an alien within the 
United States, (2) the alien was in the United States illegally, (3) the defendant knew of 
or recklessly disregarded the fact that the alien was in the United States illegally, and (4) 
the defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law.” Silveus, 
542 F.3d at 1002. Davidson and Delva argue that there was insufficient evidence at trial 
to establish that they “knew of or recklessly disregarded the fact” that the individuals they 
transported were illegal aliens, and that they were acting “willfully in furtherance of the 
alien[s’] violation of the law.” Id.  
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 We agree with the District Court that there was more than enough evidence 
presented at trial for a reasonable jury to find Appellants guilty under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
Several pieces of evidence were introduced to prove Appellants’ knowledge or reckless 
disregard of their passengers’ illegal alien status. One of the illegal aliens transported by 
Appellants, Yvener Elizee, testified at trial that Appellants saw him and his family 
emerging from the bushes where they had been hiding and said, “Look at two Haitians. 
Let’s hold them.” (J.A. 73.) Elizee also testified that Delva asked him if he had come 
from Haiti and when he had arrived. Elizee replied that he had come from Haiti the 
previous night. From this conversation, a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
Delva knew that his passengers had entered the United States illegally. The passengers’ 
peculiar location (bushes on the far side of the road) and the time of their arrival into the 
country suggested illegal activity.  
 Furthermore, at trial, a CBP officer testified that upon Davidson’s arrest, he 
confessed that he had been driving in the area where the Haitians had taken refuge 
because a friend (with whom he was driving) had asked him to pick up certain 
individuals.
3
 Given that no one other than Delva and the illegal aliens were identified as 
having traveled in Davidson’s car, it would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude 
that the “friend” Davidson referred to was Delva. Davidson also stated that on previous 
occasions he had been paid about a hundred dollars or had been given gas money in 
exchange for “picking up people.” (App. 176.) We agree with the District Court that 
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 This prior statement tended to cast doubt over Davidson’s claim at trial that he picked 




based on these statements, the jury could have reasonably found that Davidson and Delva 
knew of their passengers’ illegal immigration status and intentionally transported them. 
Knowledge could also be inferred from Appellants’ suspicious behavior when they 
encountered the police. At trial, a CBP officer testified that Davidson did not initially 
stop the truck when he came to the roadblock, but instead tried to drive around it. 
Another officer testified that when the truck finally came to a stop, Delva exited the 
vehicle and fled on foot. This evasive behavior could reasonably give rise to an inference 
of illegal activity and knowledge of its illegality.  
 For these reasons, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support both 
Davidson and Delva’s convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii).  
2. Assault of a Federal Officer with a Deadly Weapon 
 A defendant is guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) if he “forcibly assaults, resists, 
opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of 
this title when engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.” Under      
§ 111(b), there is an enhanced penalty when a deadly or dangerous weapon is used. A car 
may be used as a deadly weapon. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200 (2004) (citing 
Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Arrington, 
309 F.3d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that a car may be a deadly weapon where it is 
not merely used as “a mode of transportation” or “purely for flight”).  
 As the District Court explained, the testimony of two CBP officers showed that 
Davidson had driven the truck towards them and “failed to stop immediately despite 
repeated commands to do so.” (App. 15-16.) The truck only stopped after an officer drew 
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his gun and pointed it at the vehicle. We agree with the District Court that, “[f]rom this 
evidence, a rational jury could reasonably conclude that Davidson intentionally used his 
car in a deadly or dangerous manner to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, 
intimidate, or interfere with CBP officers while engaged in the performance of their 
official duties.” (App. 16.) Although Davidson testified at trial that he failed to come to 
an immediate stop when he encountered the CBP officers because of an anti-locking 
mechanism in his brakes, a reasonable jury could have found his testimony to lack 
credibility. As such, the District Court properly denied Davidson’s motion for a judgment 
of acquittal with respect to Count Two.  
B. Admission of Davidson’s Statement 
 Davidson argues, for the first time, that the probative value of his statement to the 
CBP upon his arrest that he had been driving with a friend who had instructed him to 
“pick up people,” was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and should have been excluded 
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
4
 At trial, only Delva’s lawyer objected 
to the introduction of this statement. We therefore review the District Court’s decision to 
admit Davidson’s statement through the testimony of the CBP officer for plain error. See 
United States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2004). Davidson argues that 
admission of the CBP officer’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial because, “[h]er 
testimony implied defendant Delva was referring to the illegal aliens” when he asked 
                                              
4
 Prior to trial, Davidson’s lawyer only objected to the introduction of any “comment by 
[Davidson] saying he received money from Mr. Delva for transporting aliens.” (J.A. 41.) 
On appeal, Davidson does not appear to take issue with the District Court’s ruling on the 
admission of that statement.  
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Davidson to pick up “people.” Davidson’s Br. 18. We find no error in the admission of 
this statement. The statement goes to show that Davidson did not randomly come across a 
family in distress and pick them up but rather, had a pre-arrangement with Delva to pick 
up a group of people. The high probative value of this statement clearly outweighed any 
potential prejudice to Davidson. Therefore the statement was properly admitted.  
C. Jury Instruction on Defense of Justification 
 We review a district court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction for abuse 
of discretion. United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008). “As a general 
proposition, a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for 
which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Virgin 
Islands v. Lewis, 620 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also United States v. Mike, 655 F.3d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that court is not 
obligated to give a requested jury instruction where defendant’s evidence is legally 
insufficient to establish the proffered defense). We view the facts in the light most 
favorable to Davidson in determining whether there was evidence to support the defense 
of justification. See Lewis, 620 F.3d at 364.  
 The District Court interpreted Davidson’s request for a justification defense to 
concern Count Two, however, Davidson appears to argue that he was entitled to the 
justification defense on Count One. See Davidson’s Br. 15. To the extent that the District 
Court properly interpreted Davidson’s request, we affirm the District Court’s decision to 
deny the request for substantially the same reasons stated in the Court’s memorandum 
opinion. Even if Davidson believed he was entitled to a jury instruction on the 
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justification defense with respect to Count One, however, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying his request. 
 To establish the affirmative defense of justification, a defendant must show:  
 
First, that [the defendant] was under an immediate, unlawful threat of death 
or serious bodily injury to himself or to others; 
 
Second, that [the defendant] had a well-grounded [or reasonable] fear that 
the threat would be carried out if he did not commit the offense; 
 
Third, that [the defendant’s] criminal action was directly caused by the 
need to avoid the threatened harm and that [the defendant] had no 
reasonable, lawful opportunity to avoid the threatened harm without 
committing the offense; that is, that [the defendant] had no reasonable 
lawful opportunity both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid 
the threatened harm; and 
 
Fourth, that [the defendant] had not recklessly placed himself in a situation 
in which he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct. 
 
United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Third Cir. Model 
Crim. Jury Instr. § 8.04). To carry his burden, the defendant must prove the elements of 
the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 
347 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Davidson has not shown that there was sufficient evidence to 
meet his burden. In fact, there was no evidence at trial to establish the first element of the 
justification defense – that is, there was no evidence of “an immediate, unlawful threat of 
death or serious bodily injury to himself or to others.” Taylor, 686 F.3d at 186. Even if 
the pregnant woman that Davidson aided by transporting her was in distress, as he 
alleges, there was no evidence that any threat of death or bodily injury was “unlawful.” 
On this element alone, Davidson’s justification defense would have failed. The District 
Court, therefore, properly omitted the jury instruction on the defense.  
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D. Voir Dire on Testimony of Law Enforcement Officers 
 We review the District Court’s conduct during voir dire for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 392 (3d Cir. 2012). “Voir dire examination 
serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting 
counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 
(1991). “‘Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance 
with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions, 
federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct 
the voir dire.’” Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 393 (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 
451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981)).  
 Davidson argues that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to question 
prospective jurors on whether they would give more weight to the testimony of law 
enforcement officers than to that of civilian witnesses. He says that since the Government 
had no evidence independent of the testimony of the CBP officers on Count Two, the 
jury’s determination as to the officers’ credibility was crucial for a conviction. Davidson 
argues that an inquiry into prospective jurors’ potential law enforcement bias was, 
therefore, necessary to “adequately probe [for] the possibility of prejudice.” Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1993).  
 We have held that “‘where government law enforcement agents are apt to be key 
witnesses, the trial court, particularly if seasonably requested, should ordinarily make 
inquiry into whether prospective jurors are inclined to have greater faith in the agents’ 
testimony merely by virtue of their official positions.’” Butler v. City of Camden, 352 
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F.3d 811, 817 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 84 
(1st Cir. 1990)) (internal alterations omitted). Failure to engage in such an inquiry may be 
harmless, however, where “the trial court’s charge to the jury may have remediated any 
prejudice.” Id. at 818.  
 Here, the District Court’s instruction to the jury prior to their deliberation 
effectively mitigated any prejudice Davidson may have suffered during the jury selection 
process. The District Court gave the following instruction:  
You’ve heard the testimony of law enforcement officials. The fact that a 
witness may be employed by the government as a law enforcement official 
does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily deserving of more or 
less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary 
witness. 
 
At the same time, it is quite legitimate for defense counsel to try to attack 
the credibility of law enforcement witnesses on the grounds that their 
testimony may be colored by a personal or professional interest in the 
outcome of the case. 
 
(App. 243-44.) We assume that jurors “follow the law as instructed by the court.” Butler, 
352 F.3d at 818. Therefore, any harm suffered by Davidson as a result of an inadequate 
voir dire was cured through the District Court’s jury charge. The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion.  
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm Davidson and Delva’s judgments of 
conviction.  
